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ABSTRACT
In 1956, the British Ministry of Health instituted a vaccination 
programme against poliomyelitis, but run into myriad supply and 
administrative issues. When Coventry experienced an epidemic 
in 1957, it came to symbolise these problems. Throughout, it was 
claimed that the government lacked ‘common sense’. This article 
explores how and why ‘common sense’ was used as a rhetorical 
weapon in the debates over policy at the local and national level. 
While those claiming ‘common sense’ were often at odds with medical 
and administrative authorities, the arguments were often informed 
by deeply held beliefs about vaccination and disease.
In the summer of 1957, Coventry became the subject of national attention when an outbreak 
of poliomyelitis1 struck the city. A series of supply issues had led to a shortage of the new 
polio vaccine, and many who had registered their children for immunisation were yet to 
receive their course of injections. Worse, the Ministry of Health refused to divert vaccine 
from non-epidemic areas to help deal with the crisis, or even to import extra supplies from 
abroad. Over July, August and September, the press made a series of accusations about 
government incompetence at the local and national levels, claiming that this was an avoid-
able tragedy. Many of the criticisms would feel familiar to observers across the post-war 
period in Britain. The Ministry was, apparently, too bureaucratic, putting procedure above 
people’s lives; the medical authorities were not quick enough to arrive at concrete solutions 
to various problems as they arose; more than that, the experts were crippled by a lack of 
‘commonsense’.2
This article examines how these issues manifested through the debate over polio vaccine 
supply in the city of Coventry. It focuses on two main questions. First, why did the Ministry 
of Health refuse to redirect vaccine to Coventry and other epidemic areas to help manage 
the outbreak? Second, in the face of a nationwide shortage, why did the national government 
refuse either to seek foreign supplies or to accept offers of help from abroad? To explain this, 
government papers and press articles are examined at the national and local level, and 
placed into the wider context of public health at this time.
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The debate about Coventry’s epidemic was part of a larger national and even international 
network of politicians, medical professionals, press and administrators. Its history draws atten-
tion to the fact that British public health in the post-war era was not solely a national concern 
and that there were many actors claiming to represent different publics within this framework. 
each drew on different forms of epistemic authority, while also claiming to be working in the 
interests of ‘the public’ in general terms. In the press, at least, it was clear that the most accept-
able solutions to the crisis would have to adhere to the laws of common sense. What is most 
striking, however, is not whether cultural understandings of disease accorded with the latest 
scientific consensus or bureaucratic practice. rather, it is the use of common sense as a rhe-
torical device, particularly in public discourse. Who used common sense? When did they feel 
able to employ it? What can this tell us about public attitudes to disease?
‘Common’ sense
Anthropologist Kate Crehan notes that ‘common sense’ is, ironically, a common sense concept 
that few academics have tried to define. Versions of the phrase exist in multiple european 
languages. In the Anglophonic world, it has been seen as generally positive; yet in Italy, the 
idea of ‘senso comune’ is a more neutral description of ‘beliefs and opinions supposedly 
shared by the masses of the population’, including both wisdom and superstition.3 This idea 
of unsaid, generally accepted beliefs pervades through much ethnographic research, too. 
Anthropologists attempt to delve into the belief systems of communities to get beyond 
what people literally say to understand what they mean. Here, grasping the ‘common sense’ 
of a culture distanced by language, place and/or time offers the possibility of richer analyses 
of various social phenomena.4 Historians have made similar attempts to dig deeper into 
their source materials, trying to discover the unwritten by reading ‘along the archival grain’. 
There is much to be learned from what was ‘unwritten’ ‘because it could go without saying 
and “everyone” knew it’, ‘because it could not yet be articulated’ and ‘because it could not be 
said’.5 There is also a wealth of historical research that seeks to show that many parts of 
society that are believed to be ‘natural’ are very much dependent on historical and cultural 
context. These historians seek to ‘undermine the authority of what passes for “common sense” 
in the particular society in which they live and write’.6
This article does not attempt to reconstruct Britain’s common sense in 1957. Instead, it 
focuses on the rhetorical uses of the concept in political discourse. This follows on from 
Sophia rosenfeld’s work on common sense as a key weapon in the battles over emerging 
democratic institutions extending back to at least the Glorious revolution in the Anglophonic 
world.7 This was most notably expressed in Thomas paine’s 1776 pamphlet Common Sense, 
but many actors have sought to draw on common sense’s epistemic power.8 Any argument 
that could be tied to a universal knowledge, innate to right-thinking persons, would require 
a great burden of proof to be overturned.9 Indeed, rosenfeld argues that this is what made 
the concept central to democratic legitimacy. It validated political decisions made on behalf 
of the people by rooting them in collective knowledge. Crucially, it also acted as a bulwark 
against other forms of epistemic authority which may have been a threat to liberal proper-
ty-owning democracy: namely theology and superstition on the one hand, and abstract 
philosophy and technocracy on the other.10
yet expertise and common sense have to coexist for the establishment and maintenance 
of expert-informed policy. On some level, the people have to trust that experts can identify 
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and solve problems in the common interest. Similarly, expertise has to prove its ability to 
do so, and communicate this effectively to the public.11 In the 1950s, this was broadly the 
case, as post-war Britain had embraced technocratic solutions to long-standing problems. 
Mike Savage’s work with the Mass Observation archive shows that the middle classes began 
to see technical expertise as a marker of class identity.12 In the realm of public health, ‘evi-
dence’ became used in ‘policy’ increasingly from 1945 onwards. The social medicine research 
of academics such as Jerry Morris and the epidemiological statistical work of richard doll 
and Austin Bradford Hill revealed (among many other phenomena) the benefits of exercise 
and the dangers of smoking.13 Moreover, there were concrete public health victories that 
authorities could point to. The national vaccination campaign against diphtheria from 1940 
onwards had made a significant impact on morbidity and mortality.14 The well-established 
local authority public health system had also done much to reduce the burden of disease 
over the course of the interwar period.15 To be sure, there was opposition to the technocrat 
or the specialist as ‘ignorant’ of the wider factors that were required to make political deci-
sions; but, as Michael edgerton argues, the idea of scientific, technocratic governance was 
not completely rejected.16 Science and common sense were therefore not opposed; it was 
possible to argue that the use of science and evidence to solve a problem was, in itself, 
common sense.
When discussing political arguments, however, there is one fundamental and crucial irony. 
Common sense could only be employed as a political tool when the consensus of universally 
accepted knowledge broke down. Its users sought to represent the interests of a particular 
constituency (be they an imagined majority or minority) while simultaneously appealing to 
the universal wisdom of the entire population. Common sense has often been linked with 
‘the public’ and the ‘public good’,17 another concept that is supposedly universal but has 
repeatedly been shown to be fractured.18 As debates in the sociology of science have also 
highlighted, science also does not have a monopoly on truth, nor can its systems of knowl-
edge production always keep pace with ‘the speed of politics’.19 extensive print media, radio 
and the newly created Independent Television allowed various forms of knowledge to cir-
culate quickly.20 In the debate over Coventry’s 1957 epidemic, multiple publics could be 
invoked in multiple media and, as will be shown, multiple ‘common’ senses. The question is, 
who was wielding common sense as a weapon, how did they do it, and who did they claim 
to represent?
This analysis uses internal files from the Ministry of Health and the Medical research 
Council (MrC) to investigate the government’s approach. Coventry History Centre also holds 
the records of the City Council minutes and the Medical Officer of Health’s reports. From the 
media, a mix of local and national press is considered. The primary national title is that of 
The Times, often referred to as Britain’s ‘paper of record’. It tended to report from the per-
spective of the British establishment in london. Also included are the Guardian (a left-leaning 
broadsheet), the Daily Mirror (a left-leaning populist tabloid) and the Daily Express (a 
right-leaning middle-class tabloid). In the medical press, the British Medical Journal (BMJ) 
was published weekly and included correspondence from doctors as well as editorials on 
government policy. At the local level in Coventry, there were two newspapers. The Coventry 
Evening Telegraph (hereafter, Telegraph) was published Monday–Saturday, and released in 
the late afternoon, meaning it often reported on news and events that may have been missed 
by the national dailies. The Coventry Standard, meanwhile, was a weekly paper that went on 
sale every Friday. It tended to contain more stories about local events and people than its 
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daily competitor, though it did run editorials on the polio epidemic with regard to Coventry’s 
position within the national picture.
Salk vaccine and British supply
The reason that Coventry became a rhetorical battle ground in 1957 was bound up in recent 
medical and technical developments in the treatment and prevention of poliomyelitis. The 
disease was a relatively new phenomenon, with the first epidemics occurring in Sweden 
and the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first major 
epidemic in Britain occurred in 1947.21 From that point until the 1960s, summers were punc-
tuated with a ‘polio season’, resulting in thousands of cases per year.22 Hays uses the term 
‘virgin soil infection’ to describe its impact. For while the disease itself is thought to be as 
old as humanity, it was not until the late 1800s that it became visible, identifiable and hit 
communities in epidemic fashion.23 polio is transmitted through the gut, and in the majority 
of cases does not present with symptoms. However, for a minority, it can cause muscle 
weakness and, in severe cases, paralysis. Although the death rate was higher for adults than 
children, its ability to confer lifelong weakness or paralysis in children provoked dread in 
parents. Imagery of children on polio wards inside iron lungs caused similar anxiety. Indeed, 
the disease was commonly referred to as infantile paralysis.24 polio also caused disquiet 
among medical professionals because it had become a growing threat despite—perhaps 
even because of—the ‘successes’ of public health measures and biomedicine over the pre-
vious 100 years.25 Further, it appeared to affect rich and poor alike and, being viral rather 
than bacterial, was unaffected by the new ‘magic bullet’ antibiotics of the 1940s and 1950s.26
Hopes of eradication (or at least effective control) were placed upon immunisation tech-
nology. In 1955, the University of Michigan announced in front of the world’s media that an 
anti-polio vaccine developed by Jonas Salk had been shown to be safe and effective in a 
massive trial on American children.27 There were three types of poliovirus, and so strains of 
polio that could immunise against all three were chosen. A strain called ‘Mahoney’ was used 
against Type-I, ‘MeF-1’ for Type-II and ‘Saukett’ Type-III. The viruses were inactivated using 
formaldehyde, ensuring that the immune system could respond to the material and develop 
immunity to poliovirus but that there was no chance of actually infecting the patient.28 A 
full course involved three doses. Within hours, it was licensed for use in the United States. 
denmark developed its own form of the vaccine using a similar technique,29 while British 
health authorities also began investigating the possibility of using immunisation as a way 
of combatting polio. It had to be used as part of a mass vaccination schedule, since immunity 
took time to develop. While the injected vaccine would take around six weeks to confer 
protection, ‘natural’ polio could enter through the digestive system and either result in infec-
tion or pass through excrement to infect other people. In time, an oral vaccine developed 
by Albert Sabin would be crucial as it provided immunity in a much shorter space of time 
and is now used by the World Health Organization as an effective tool for managing epi-
demics.30 However, it was still under development and testing in 1957, and so was not a 
factor in Coventry.31
The polio vaccine came under scrutiny almost as quickly as it had been hailed as a medical 
marvel. In 1955, a faulty batch of Salk vaccine was released from Cutter laboratories. The 
virus had not been inactivated, meaning that children were directly injected with live and 
potent poliovirus. Confined to the United States, some 400,000 doses were administered, 
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leading to 260 cases and ten deaths.32 The Cutter Incident, as it became known, caused 
trepidation for a number of governments across the developed world.33 The British author-
ities were particularly keen to ensure that standards of safety and efficacy were guarded. 
Initial trials of the vaccine in the country were halted in the summer of 1955, and the MrC 
sent investigators to America to determine what had gone wrong. In the British parliament, 
Mps sought assurances that the safety of British citizens would be safeguarded.34 More impor-
tantly, authorities were unwilling to risk tainting the reputation of vaccination in general, 
which had been a key tool in reducing rates of diphtheria, tuberculosis and smallpox in 
particular.35
regardless of Cutter, the British medical authorities were convinced that it was possible 
to make a more potent and safer version of an inactivated polio vaccine. In particular, they 
felt that the ‘Mahoney’ strain of polio that had been isolated and inactivated in Salk’s vaccine 
was not as efficient as the Type-II and Type-III strains being used. It was also failure to inac-
tivate Mahoney that had caused the Cutter Incident. research suggested that even though 
the risk of complications from the American vaccine was very slight, another Type-I strain 
may reduce these risks even further. British manufacturers began synthesising a new product 
based on the Brunden poliovirus strain, which, testing had shown, met these criteria.36 
Additionally, the MrC and Ministry of Health were convinced that British safety testing pro-
cedures were more robust than those across the Atlantic. partially this was built on national 
pride at the historical quality of British medicine, and partly as a result of Cutter. Medical 
authorities had been similarly cautious over the introduction of Bacillus Calmette–Guérin 
(BCG, the antituberculosis vaccine) and diphtheria immunisation, preferring instead to rely 
on tried-and-tested public health systems or disinfection, quarantine and hospital care. The 
fact that these were foreign technologies had caused trepidation, especially in the case of 
BCG.37 Testing procedures also took longer in Britain and were more thorough, suggesting 
a higher standard of potency and efficiency.38 The Ministry was therefore reluctant to use a 
vaccine that was potentially ‘unsafe’ when compared to the British version—even though 
the risks of either had been shown to be low, and even though two of the three strains in 
the vaccine were identical. Concurrently, officials believed that it was important for British 
economic interests to have a strong, alternative vaccine to the Americans’. The government 
worried that if Britain was slow to exploit it, this lucrative new market could potentially leave 
it frozen out later in the century.39 There is little evidence in the MrC papers that this was 
born out of any specific ‘anti-American’ sentiment; though it is hard not to see elements of 
insecurity stemming from Britain’s changing role as a world power. The eden and later 
Macmillan governments were certainly concerned about British diplomatic and financial 
interests on the world stage; and the pharmaceutical industry was certainly one area in 
which Britain could remain influential.40 On this basis, the Ministry refused to allow local 
authorities to use the American product as part of their general vaccination programmes, 
justified by ‘medical evidence’ from the MrC.41 This claim would be contested during the 
1957 epidemic.
After reviewing the evidence on Cutter and concluding that the incident was a result of 
manufacturing error rather than a fundamental flaw in inactivated vaccine technology, the 
MrC trials restarted in late 1955.42 They suggested that the British vaccine was safe and 
effective. The eden government committed itself to a vaccination programme involving 
children aged under ten in January 1956 in what became known as the Turton announce-
ment (after then Health Minister robin Turton).43 This meant that the refusal to use Salk 
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created some significant technical problems.44 First, British companies did not have the 
manpower or laboratory space to produce enough of the vaccine. Only two companies—
Glaxo and Burroughs Wellcome—had been licensed to make the vaccine, and the latter had 
faced significant delays. Only Glaxo was producing and releasing the vaccine for public 
consumption during the Coventry epidemic.45 registration rates for the newly announced 
programme were relatively low (around 29 per cent of those eligible),46 and the British version 
only required two doses; but even so, manufacturers found it difficult to establish a reliable 
supply chain. It became clear that Britain and British pharmaceutical companies could not 
produce the vaccine quickly enough to reach everyone before the polio season began that 
summer.47 not only were batches of the vaccine difficult to produce, they had to go through 
a testing procedure that could take around three months, so any delays in manufacture had 
knock-on effects. There was also limited testing capacity, meaning that the whole system 
acted like a ‘pipeline’. One batch had to be manufactured, added to the testing queue and 
then cleared before work could start on the next.48 In an attempt to overcome the shortages, 
Glaxo was asked by the Ministry of Health to increase its production by 50 per cent. It 
agreed.49 yet, the company was mindful about the immense costs involved in competing 
for specialists from an emerging (and rather small) pool of talent, and the ‘possible future 
redundancy of staff and capital assets’ once the first generation of children was vaccinated.50 
There may have been millions of children and young adults to vaccinate in the next few 
years, but, once this backlog was cleared, demand would effectively fall to the annual birth 
rate. Besides, even if Glaxo did set up a new laboratory, it would take between six and twelve 
months to build, plus another six before the first batch was produced, tested and ready for 
use.51
The British government was thus in a precarious position, partly of its own making. even 
allowing for the arguments over increased safety and efficiency, the programme of vacci-
nating the under tens left them very little margin for error. If a batch was delayed or faulty, 
there would not be enough supply to vaccinate all those registered before the polio season 
began in the summer.52 Unfortunately for the Ministry, this happened in February 1957 when 
a batch of the Glaxo vaccine changed colour while in transit, suggesting that a foreign body 
had contaminated the vials. Immediately, production was halted while the medical author-
ities investigated.53 The Times’s reaction was unfavourable.
This frustrating series of official announcements can give rise to nothing but concern, not only 
among the parents of the [c. 1.7 million] registered for vaccination last year and still awaiting 
the oft-promised vaccine but also among family doctors and medical officers of health. […] 
What should be made abundantly clear is that these delays are in no way the fault of the MrC 
or [Glaxo]. […] What seems to have happened is that the Minister took a gamble and announced 
the probable date on which the vaccine might be ready, knowing full well that no one could 
give any guarantee.54
The BMJ was similarly scathing. It accused the government of using polio vaccine as a public 
relations exercise, and, initially at least, failing to inform the medical press about the specifics 
of the vaccine. Offended by the ‘American’ style conference that had initially proclaimed the 
programme, it quipped that ‘the dream-like stage … proved to be more fitting than seemed 
possible at the time.’55
It is into this context, then, that the 1957 epidemic in Coventry was born. The national 
press was already agitated by what appeared to be mismanagement by the Ministry of 
Health. Thousands of children who ought to have been vaccinated by the time of the 1957 
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polio season had yet to complete their course of injections. And, through it all, supplies of 
the vaccine arrived slowly, with no reserve and no hope of ramping up production in the 
near future. Having promised that 300,000–500,000 children would be fully vaccinated with 
two doses by June 1957, just 200,000 had been by the beginning of March, many with only 
a single injection.56
Why Coventry?
Coventry had found itself victim to these supply issues, with only 6,000 of its 11,000 registered 
children receiving the vaccine.57 This became politically sensitive when an epidemic ran 
through the city in the summer of 1957. Coventry was in Warwickshire, around 25 kilometres 
east of Birmingham and 140 kilometres north-west of london.58 Over the twentieth century, 
it had become a centre for car and motor cycle manufacturing. during the 1950s, a massive 
rebuilding project had been required due to heavy damage sustained during devastating 
German bombing raids in 1940. The city’s population was expanding, both as a result of 
declining mortality rates and migration from Ireland and other areas to work in the motor 
industry.59 despite the national Conservative government, Coventry had a predominantly 
labour council, and all three of the city’s Members of parliament (Mps) represented labour. 
Two of these, Maurice edelman and richard Crossman, were nationally recognised. Crossman 
was a political heavyweight, and would go on to be the key architect of social security policy 
in the Wilson governments of the 1960s.60 edelman, meanwhile, was an author who was 
adept at using the media. He had written plays for the newly formed Independent Television 
Association, and would be the main campaigner in parliament for Coventry during the epi-
demic.61 The ‘crisis’ in Coventry played out over the course of just a few months, with most 
of the news stories being printed in the first weeks of August. While the epidemic itself was 
newsworthy, edelman’s machinations undoubtedly focused national attention. As drakeford 
and Butler have argued, the existence of a problem is not enough to make it a political 
scandal. Some group needs to articulate why the general population should care, and it 
needs to capture the public mood.62 Coventry did not have the worst rates of polio per capita 
in the country, but its plight was framed as the consequence of chronic government mis-
management.63 In edelman, the City had an articulate national spokesman to make this case, 
and, whether by design or by coincidence, he created a scandal that could not be ignored.
The press in Coventry reported an upsurge in polio cases in mid-July. Medical Officer of 
Health, dr. Thomas Morris Clayton, made announcements and undertook interviews to help 
disseminate public health advice.64 Concern had been raised as the number of cases up to 
that point implied that the summer of 1957 would see more poliomyelitis than the previous 
worst year for the disease in the city, 1953. Clayton wrote to the Ministry of Health asking 
for more supplies of polio vaccine to help build greater immunity in the population. On 
Friday, 2 August, Clayton told the City that this request had been denied.65 At this point, 
Maurice edelman, the Mp for Coventry north, took up the matter in Westminster. He 
announced that he would meet with the Ministry and make another request. After a tele-
phone call on Saturday morning, he declared that the government had changed its mind 
and would be providing more vaccine for Coventry. His success was reported in the Saturday 
evening edition of the Telegraph.66 Some local and national news followed suit on Monday 
morning.67
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These reports came as a surprise to the Ministry of Health, where officials were convinced 
that edelman had been told nothing of the sort. They spent most of Saturday informing the 
news agency extel that there had been no change of policy, and convinced the BBC and ITV 
not to run with the story in their evening news bulletins. They also issued denials to the 
newspapers that had run the story.68 Whether edelman was lying, twisting the facts or had 
misinterpreted the Ministry is open to interpretation. The government had announced that 
a new batch of vaccine was on its way, and that Coventry would be getting its share.69 In a 
sense, Coventry was getting more vaccine; just nothing over and above what it would have 
received in normal circumstances. On the other hand, when a civil servant spoke to the 
Telegraph to clarify the story, he quoted the paper: ‘We are not surprised. We never believed 
the edelman story anyway; he only believes what he wants to believe’. This certainly was an 
opportunity for edelman to launch a campaign of local significance, as well as allowing a 
prominent opposition Mp to attack the government of the day. His constituency was also 
the most heavily hit by the disease.70 regardless, the news of extra vaccine had been given 
a warm reception by the press, and when this was found to be false it provoked confusion 
and resentment.71 edelman’s announcement drew attention to the problems within the 
vaccination programme.72 It was reported as if the government was sticking to its policies 
in the face of ‘commonsense’.73
Common sense was a recurring trope in the coverage of the epidemic, as it has been in 
political discourse for centuries.74 Here, it was claimed by a number of different constituen-
cies. Medical authorities appealed for calmer heads and recognition of the need for com-
promise at times of shortage. The local press and politicians, meanwhile, argued that 
technocratic and bureaucratic rigidity was overriding the wishes and rights of the city’s 
population. Throughout, common sense would be invoked in different ways by different 
authorities claiming to represent different constituencies (or ‘publics’). To demonstrate this 
in the context of the Coventry epidemic, two distinct, but entwined, issues are worth con-
sidering: the refusal of the Ministry of Health to redirect vaccine supplies to Coventry; and 
the refusal to accept vaccine from foreign suppliers when it was offered.
Redirection
The common sense response from local politicians and press was that populations ought 
to receive vaccination in times of epidemic. This was seen as a defence against further infec-
tion, and a way of containing the spread of infectious disease. Such tactics had been used, 
alongside quarantine and sanitation methods, to combat outbreaks of smallpox. It was also 
well established by law and precedent that local public health authorities, with the support 
of the national government, would undertake such operations. Thus, was it not ‘common 
sense’ that supplies of the vaccine should be funnelled to Coventry and other epidemic-af-
fected regions?
The Ministry argued that it could not redirect extra supplies to Coventry. It had no reserves, 
since the vaccine was distributed as soon as it was approved.75 each local authority received 
a proportion of each batch relative to the number of registered people in the area. Further, 
it was unwilling to divert vaccine away from places which had not yet developed an epidemic 
for fear of the political consequences should one occur. every locality, therefore, had already 
received its ‘fair share’.76 Indeed, the government went so far as to say Coventry had received 
even more than others on the basis of its high registration rate. Forty per cent of those eligible 
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had registered, compared to the national average of 29. By comparison, Warwickshire’s rate 
was 43 per cent, neighbouring Staffordshire 24, and Birmingham 30.77
even if both sides of this argument accepted the general principle of vaccination, other 
common sense attitudes led to different political conclusions. For the national authorities, 
it was logical and self-evident that compromises had to be made in times of scarcity. The 
local medical administrator agreed. Thomas Clayton, Coventry’s Medical Officer of Health, 
responded to the government’s rejection in the press by stating:
We would obviously like to be in possession of a great deal more vaccine. It is a positive and 
important means of preventing cases occurring. But we are not in a position of unlimited supplies 
so we have to apply commonsense.78
Those claiming to represent citizens, however, were not impressed. edelman had a 
 meeting with John Vaughan-Morgan, the acting Minister of Health,79 and told the press:
I pleaded that the commonsense of the public would favour emergency measures to deal with 
an emergency area and that it was necessary to take a slight risk in diverting supplies.80
Invoking ‘commonsense’ and ‘the public’ at this point exposes a number of intriguing 
issues. In terms of the local public, edelman was on strong ground. editorials in and letters 
to the Telegraph and Standard showed local demand for more vaccine.81 At the national level, 
however, there was room for debate. perhaps edelman was correct in assuming that the 
public in polio-free areas would be willing to suspend their vaccination programme in the 
short term. The Daily Mirror argued that the government’s stance was ‘fair … in normal 
conditions. But to insist on it now is high-bound officialdom’.82 For Vaughan-Morgan, on the 
other hand, the problem was not the public of today, but an imagined public of the future 
should the Ministry take an active decision to redirect supplies from an area that later on in 
the summer could develop an epidemic. ‘The public’ was an important rhetorical tool, one 
that could shift in place and time depending on the argument being made.83
There were sound technical reasons for overruling the common sense of the people of 
Coventry. The solution to a smallpox epidemic was not necessarily correct for poliomyelitis. 
Clayton argued that the press had ‘gone too much to town’ on vaccine supplies, overempha-
sising the short-term benefits.
every Medical Officer would welcome greater supplies of the vaccine as it was the only practical 
measure that could be taken to combat polio in present conditions. But this was not going to 
alter the present situation at all. It might take two or three months to get immunity into a person. 
It was not for the present epidemic, but as a future preventative measure.84
This information was used by both sides of the debate. An editorial in the Telegraph still 
argued that it would be ‘a matter of commonsense’ to divert the vaccine—even if it took six 
weeks to develop immunity, this would help the city by the end of the polio season.85 The 
Ministry, on the other hand, stressed that the nation’s resources would be better used across 
the whole population rather than in local circumstances. The Daily Express showed sympathy 
with Coventry, but ultimately concluded ‘there is not enough [vaccine]—and anyway it prob-
ably would not help’.86
Medical advice also suggested that vaccination was counterproductive in epidemic sit-
uations. The Joint Committee on polio Vaccination (a policy advisory body mainly of officials 
from the Ministry of Health and the Scottish health authorities) and the World Health 
Organization both argued that vaccination ought to be suspended in the wake of a serious 
epidemic.87 Medical opinion had only recently begun to shift away from this stance. There 
was evidence to suggest that immunisations led to an increase risk of paralysis at the site of 
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the injection. The national diphtheria advertising programme had been muted during the 
summer months as a precaution in the early 1950s as a result, and it was not until 1956 that 
the MrC advised the government that it would be acceptable to run the polio immunisation 
programme during the ‘polio season’.88 As the Ministry told edelman in a letter printed in 
the Telegraph:
Anxiety naturally stimulates a local demand for emergency measures. But it would be quite 
wrong to deal on such a footing with a problem which is unpredictable and affects all parts of 
the country. […] Vaccination is not generally accepted as being a suitable emergency measure 
to check and contain local outbreaks.89
Clayton had been annoyed that his call for more vaccine at a previous press conference 
had been interpreted as an endorsement of vaccination as an immediate solution to all the 
City’s problems.90 In this climate, ‘commonsense’, the wisdom of ‘the public’, was not a useful 
basis for national policy, at least as for the Ministry. Instead, a dispassionate view, taken on 
the national level and buttressed by the advice of medical bodies, was more important than 
the demands of local people, justified by populist understandings of vaccination and infec-
tious disease. The Ministry also had a long-term outlook, expressing its desire to maintain 
the integrity of the vaccination programme as a whole. It could not be sacrificed for local, 
short-term and acute cries for help. yet, the government still had to be mindful of the public’s 
reaction to such policies.
Refusing importation
It became clear very early into the crisis that the Ministry was not going to redirect supplies 
away from other areas. After Clayton’s and edelman’s requests were denied in early August, 
Coventry’s attention focused elsewhere. One solution was to increase national supply so 
that each local authority’s slice of the metaphorical pie became larger. yet the government 
refused to import from north America, where a number of companies were manufacturing 
the Salk-type vaccine. even when it was given direct offers, it turned these away, too.
At three points during the summer, Coventry was presented with opportunities to use 
foreign-made vaccine. The first was in early August when the danish paper Berlingske Tidende 
ran a campaign to raise money to buy polio vaccine from the government of denmark. The 
country had a history of providing vaccination aid to other nations, and the Coventry story 
had made some impact in Copenhagen.91 However, the appeal was soon dropped. ‘We were 
told an official demand must come before anything could be done’, said O Mikkelsen, the 
paper’s london correspondent, ‘and that would not come from england because of the 
British attitude on importing vaccine’.92 Another came from the pasteur Institute, which 
proposed to donate a French-made vaccine to Coventry. edelman had liaised with the French 
laboratory and presented this to the Ministry of Health, in part due to his role as chair of the 
Franco-British parliamentary relations Committee.93 Much like in Britain, French authorities 
were developing a new type of vaccine that was supposedly safer than the American ver-
sion.94 The Ministry investigated the possibility, but soon concluded that it was ‘unacceptable 
in a number of ways’.95 There was ‘no evidence of satisfactory studies in human volunteers’, 
no controlled trial, and the vaccine contained penicillin and streptomycin which in the view 
of the Ministry ‘involves danger to the health of the community’. Although designed to help 
avoid contamination of vials, no thorough testing had been done on the safety of such 
agents in vaccines.96 edelman accepted the decision, but argued that more still needed to 
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be done to secure better supplies.97 He had succeeded in causing another headache for the 
Ministry, however. This time it was a diplomatic incident with the French government, 
unhappy at the apparent snub of French medical science and offer of aid in a time of 
crisis.98
The most instructive case involved American vaccine. Charles Braham, a Coventry busi-
nessman with links to the United States, came forward claiming to have an agreement with 
American firms to import Salk vaccine for use in the city. Clayton refused ‘with grateful 
thanks’.99 He knew the Ministry would never allow it—as it confirmed with a statement that 
‘the type of vaccine to be used in this country is a national matter and not one for decision 
by individual health authorities’.100 When the issue of supply was raised, Britain’s refusal to 
import was regularly cited as part of the problem. In the press and the wider public it did 
not seem credible to continue the embargo. Salk was considered safe enough for doctors 
to use on patients if they had received the vaccine as a ‘gift’ from the United States; but was 
not considered appropriate for the mass vaccination programme. Although designed to 
allow an element of flexibility for in a minority of cases, these contradictions caused further 
confusion and agitation.101 Again, the appeal was made to the common sense of ‘experience’: 
for, ‘surely [Salk vaccine] has been proved by experience on a vast scale in the United States 
to be effective and safe’?102 How could Salk not be ‘safe enough’ despite ‘more than 100 
million people’ being injected with it with no problems?103 ‘Informed opinion is aghast at 
the rigid attitude of the Ministry’, claimed the Telegraph, and pointed to a Lancet article that 
called the Salk ban ‘either unsafe, or unduly harsh, and in any case irrational’.104
The public face of the Ministry was accused of being ‘obscurantist’.105 In part, this was 
because there were delays in the internal decision-making process. As late as July 1957, the 
government believed ‘the best course of action’ was ‘to continue to resist pressure for the 
purchase of American vaccine, but to step up production in this country’.106 It was clear, 
however, that this position was increasingly untenable. lord Alec douglas-Home, the lord 
president of the Council,107 and Vaughan-Morgan began corresponding with Sir Harold 
Himsworth, Secretary of the MrC, on the matter.108 It had become ‘a matter of political 
importance’,109 and if domestic supplies could not be secured, ‘pressure would revive for the 
importation of the Salk vaccine from the United States’.110 As the summer went on, the 
government sought direct medical advice from the MrC to justify an import of Salk. The 
MrC, however, felt unable to do so. This caused a rhetorical conundrum, which was solved 
through announcements that allowed the government to confirm its future policy whilst 
not contradicting its previous stance. The MrC advised that the ban on Salk was no longer 
medically justified; but it stopped short of actively calling for imports to begin.111
This allowed the MrC to declare that it felt Salk was safe enough to use on the British 
people, and also permitted the government to place orders for the vaccine. popular and 
medical opinion backed this stance. Salk had been shown since Cutter to be very effective 
in reducing polio morbidity and mortality, and no major reports of injuries had come since 
1955. The MrC and BMJ, however, still stressed that the British vaccine was safer (even though 
the risks from both were still slight), both because of the strain of virus used and the more 
stringent testing procedures in the UK.112 Thus, the MrC stressed that Salk was an emergency 
measure; one that could be justified because the use of American product to immunise the 
people was better than suspending or slowing the national programme. In normal circum-
stances, the government should be making every effort to ensure British vaccine was avail-
able for all, as this was still the safer and more potent option. If the government did decide 
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to import, the MrC issued the following caveats: Salk ‘should be imported only as a temporary 
measure to bridge the gap between need and adequate supply of British vaccine’; any ‘vac-
cine purchased by public money should be subjected to safety and potency tests in this 
country’; and those receiving the vaccine should be advised ‘it is not entirely devoid of risk’.113 
In theory, this gave British parents a choice about whether they felt it better to have their 
children immunised quicker with foreign vaccine, or to wait for the home-grown product. 
The MrC’s position on British vaccine and the superiority of British testing procedures was 
therefore reaffirmed, while still allowing the government to continue the programme and 
address public concerns.
In the meantime, the government continued to gather information to make sure that 
there definitely would not be a shortfall for 1958. It was resigned to the fact it could do little 
in the current epidemic, but, given the testing procedures that were considered necessary, 
it had little time to place an order for American vaccine. While it would be difficult, though 
justifiable, to write off 1957, ‘it would become increasingly difficult to justify our leaving 
numbers of children un-protected next year’.114 Briefing papers from early September showed 
that 16.5 million extra doses were required, even allowing for increased output from Glaxo 
and Burroughs Wellcome and no further production problems. Thus, on 11 September, the 
government announced it would be placing orders for Salk vaccine. At the same time, and 
despite the problems it had experienced with children under ten, it announced that the 
vaccination programme would be extended to all children aged under 15 .115
even with the supply issues, highlighted in the press as early as February, the government 
took many months to finally agree to import Salk. These delays were seen by the Telegraph 
as ‘an extraordinary example of the ‘red tape’ mentality’116 and The Times agreed that ‘in the 
absence of a reasoned statement the citizens of Coventry cannot be blamed if they fail to 
understand why the offer of Salk vaccine made to them [by Braham] should have been 
rejected by the Ministry’.117 Both the Guardian and Daily Mail showed some sympathy with 
the government’s predicament, but both concluded that this was a crisis caused by its mis-
handling of supplies.118 The government had already overridden the wishes of the local 
public by refusing to redirect supplies to Coventry, deferring to the wider national interest. 
Was it now continuing to defy the common sense of ‘informed opinion’, which the Telegraph 
declared was ‘aghast at the rigid attitude of the Ministry in dealing with Coventry and other 
places’?119 Why did the government not take ‘a more realistic view’?120 Were these pronounce-
ments on the safety of Salk simply ‘to cover up [the Ministry’s] earlier error in failing to import 
it?’121 On these points, the criticism was rather contradictory. despite their calls for more 
vaccine supplies, The Times acknowledged that Salk and other vaccines were not a useful 
form of epidemic control; rather, they were needed to prevent future outbreaks.122 The 
Standard,123 Daily Mail124 and the City’s Medical Officer of Health125 made similar observations. 
Moreover, when parents were given the opportunity to register for the ‘safer’ British vaccine, 
most had not taken it. now, in the wake of an epidemic, opinions had seemingly reversed. 
As the Guardian made clear, ‘it should be remembered that the public, too, [had] blown hot 
and cold about the virtues of vaccination’.126 The BMJ commented on this curious state of 
affairs, noting that perhaps the medical community had not done enough to inform ‘public 
opinion’ on the relative merits of different forms of the vaccine, either in the past or in the 
present crisis.127
The British public and medical authorities had indeed blown ‘hot and cold’ on immuni-
sation, and not just in 1957. It appeared that common sense could very quickly be brought 
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into view by circumstances. england in particular had a long history of anti-vaccination 
sentiment from the nineteenth century, stemming in large part from opposition to compul-
sion measures in Victorian public health legislation.128 Much of this had waned by the post-
war era following the end of compulsion. But newer immunisations for diseases more 
common than smallpox and based on modern biomedical principles proved to be more 
popular. The national anti-diphtheria campaign, for example, reduced morbidity and mor-
tality from the disease significantly after its introduction in 1940. 12.5 million children were 
immunised between 1940 and 1956, reducing the case load from around 58,000 in 1940 
(with 2,800 deaths) to just 51 cases (and 8 deaths).129 even here, however, the British gov-
ernment had been wary about introducing such measures, believing that experience with 
smallpox vaccination showed there would be opposition from the public. It was only when 
they were thoroughly convinced that the technology was safe and—crucially—more effec-
tive than existing, time-tested public health measures that immunisations against tubercu-
losis and diphtheria were introduced. This was despite, in the case of both vaccines, evidence 
to suggest their effectiveness in other western nations.130 Moreover, diphtheria immunisation 
revealed that parents were yet to fully embrace immunisation as a ‘fact of life’ and routine 
element of childhood. In the wake vastly reduced rates of diphtheria, the number of children 
under the age of 12 months immunised against the disease dropped from over 75 per cent 
in 1949 to just 28 per cent in 1951.131 The Ministry of Health had high hopes that newer 
vaccinations against whooping cough and polio would see greater demand because parents 
still feared those diseases. But again, polio stands as an example of how parents were hesitant 
to give a new, untested vaccination to their children. As mentioned previously, Coventry’s 
registration rate of 40 per cent was relatively high. It was only in the wake of an epidemic—
seemingly fuelled by government mishandling—that it became ‘common sense’ to increase 
the availability of vaccine.
Once again, the government took a long-term view of the vaccination programme. 
Importing Salk was not going to have a material impact upon the Coventry epidemic. even 
if orders had been placed as soon as the crisis began, the insistence on testing meant that 
it would have been months before it could be used in the city. Similarly, the epidemic 
appeared to have created a ‘panic’. Was it good policy to respond to every surge in demand? 
Could the voice of common sense lose its edge when it appeared to be driven by immediate, 
panicked reactions to an acute crisis rather than the available evidence?132 Here, then, 
debates around common sense were refracted through the lens of the parties hoping to 
invoke it. For the national press, Coventry became an example of what could happen to any 
one of the local authorities in the country. Taking a more pragmatic view, national supplies 
had to be ameliorated, and common sense dictated that these come from north America.133 
In Coventry, acute demand drove both the call for Salk vaccine in the short term and in the 
medium term to ensure such a situation did not occur in the near future.
Conclusion
Alderman S Stringer’s assessment of the 1957 epidemic was apt: ‘polio disease was not a 
Coventry question—nor merely a question for Great Britain—it was international’.134 Citizens 
were caught and constrained in a number of technical and bureaucratic networks, involving 
American and British pharmaceutical companies, the Ministry of Health and the City Council. 
The Telegraph’s reflections on the epidemic made a last appeal to ‘commonsense’, perhaps 
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one thing that the local population could still keep within its control. When it had failed to 
gain significant policy concession in the immediate term with regard to vaccine supply, the 
City had focused primarily on nuisance removal and cleaning rivers, canals and pools.135 In 
pondering whether more could have been done at both the local and national level, the 
paper wrote that:
the policy to combat polio must be pursued out of season with the zeal that is felt now. … If all 
of us as a community would be more scrupulous so as to make many of these tasks unnecessary, 
how much better would it be. no-one knows what causes a polio epidemic, but in the name of 
commonsense let us not be open to the suspicion that we may have brought it on ourselves.’136
To a certain extent scandals are, as drakeford and Butler have shown, manufactured.137 
Coventry suffered 106 cases of the disease, out a population of around a quarter of a mil-
lion.138 More had been reported in 1953 without the same level of media and public scru-
tiny.139 At that time, there were attempts to downplay the condition as mild, with ‘the fear 
of polio … often worse than the complaint’.140 Councillors warned the press and others not 
to ‘scare the public’.141 But 1957 was different. Coventry was in the midst of what could be 
portrayed as a failure of national, technocratic government. Indeed, that was the basis of 
the crisis rather than the disease itself. In 1953, there had been no vaccine; in 1957 there was 
one, but its delivery system had cracked due to poor maintenance. In short, it was possible 
for edelman and others to claim their solutions to the government’s mismanagement were 
‘commonsense’. They found an outlet for these views. In part, this was because of the strength 
of feeling over polio and concern over how the vaccination programme was being run. 
However, as Vaughan-Morgan lamented, ‘unfortunately, also, the peak period of the disease 
is in the late Summer, and coincides with the “silly season” in the press’.142
Cultural memory of vaccination and public understanding of infectious disease helped 
to mould common sense. Thus, opinions and policies that drew on these memories could 
be framed as common sense and used to defend a political position. For the local press and 
politicians opposed to government policy, common sense offered protection against atti-
tudes that were seen as technocratic, uncaring, ‘rigid’ and ‘unduly harsh’.143 The wisdom of 
the public could go up against medical and expert knowledge to fight for concessions. At 
the same time, ‘informed opinion’ offered a spin on common sense.144 Still rooted in the 
reasoning and logic of the people, the Lancet could criticise government policy,145 while the 
BMJ could argue that, once the public understood some of the key details, their opinions 
would be swayed.146 This exposes a core tension in many of the arguments. Those wanting 
to wield common sense needed enough expert evidence to avoid the charge of ignorance, 
while simultaneously appealing to the innate knowledge and reasoning skills of the common 
man. They needed enough emotion to break down the heartless technocratic approach to 
disease prevention, but not so much that they appeared to be knee-jerk, panicked 
reactions.
This article, however, has not been concerned over the correct levels of information or 
emotion required to produce common sense. Instead, it has focused on the rhetorical use 
of the concept.147 What mattered, therefore, is not whether a particular argument really was 
common sense, but whether it could be claimed as such. With so many different constitu-
encies and spokespeople claiming to represent them, there could also be a range of common 
senses. edelman may have tried to manipulate the debate to his own ends, but he could 
claim the ground of common sense with a number of his criticisms of government policy. 
equally, Vaughan-Morgan and other medical authorities at the local and national level could 
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provide evidence and logic to deny edelman’s requests. In some areas, the opposition’s 
arguments effected change—after all, the government eventually began importing more 
vaccine. yet the government’s stance on redistribution won out, aided by medical and expert 
evidence that defied initial common sense conclusions.
Common sense arguments are powerful because they require a high burden of proof to 
overturn them.148 This does not mean they cannot be overturned; nor does it mean that 
experts and their knowledge are antithetical to common sense. Technocratic or bureaucratic 
arguments, when put in the correct terms, were an ample defence for the government in 
the face of opposition and dissent. This may have been due to the relatively high regard with 
which expertise was treated in the 1950s. Further study is needed on which forms of ‘exper-
tise’ were able to sway common sense in different times and circumstances. But it should be 
noted that the idea of using a mass vaccination programme, centrally controlled and based 
on cutting-edge medical technology, was at the heart of this entire crisis. From the sources 
consulted, nobody seriously challenged the idea of a technocratic solution to the scourge 
of poliomyelitis in Britain. Common sense was employed as a watchdog, to make sure tech-
nocracy remained fair and worked how it was supposed to. There was not a simple battle 
between the rational and the irrational. rather, the two were intertwined and inseparable.
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